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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
DIRECT IMPORT BUYERS'
ASSOCIATION,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 13966

K.S.L., INC.,

Defendant-Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for disparagement of quality
of goods arising out of two newscasts by the defendant
commenting editorially upon a product manufactured and
marketed by the plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the Summary
Judgment Digitized
in its
favor.
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in Appellant!s Brief
is incomplete and wholly inadequate to acquaint the
court with the essential factual background upon which
this case must be decided.

We, therefore, restate the

facts.
In the Fall of 1973, the State of Utah, as
well as the rest of the country, was confronted with
a severe and somewhat unexpected energy shortage, particularly in the sale and availability of refined petroleum
products.

In that connection a variety of measures

were under consideration both by the government and by
private industry to cope with and meet the gasoline
shortage, including reduced speed limits, closing of
service stations on Sundays and holidays, conversion to
daylight savings time on a year-round basis, and consideration to rationing of gasoline.

At that time

various means of introducing better gasoline mileage in
the operation of automobiles were being widely discussed
and debated.

Contemporaneously there was also interest

in the environmental effects of the waste products of
gasoline engines on the atmosphere.

(R. 3.9-42)
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~3~
In this background, Lynn Packer, a reporter
for defendant radio station, undertook to make a study
and to do a series of newscasts on this subject.

Two

newscasts were directed specifically at plaintiff's
products. (R. 39-42)

For the convenience of the court,

the full text of both newscasts is set forth here.
Broadcast of November 14, 1973
"The Utah man who invented !Eccono-Jets'
today said his device could cut the State's gasoline
consumption a third if installed on all cars.

Howard

Rock also said his replacement carburetor idle screw
fights pollution and increases power in addition to
saving gas.
"Eccono-Jets are sold in several Utah stores
for $5.95 a pair.

The inventor said they cost 20 cents

a pair to manufacture - but royalties, packaging, marketing, and profits drive the price up.
"Eccono-Jets replace the idle screws already
on an engine!s carburetor.

The difference: A hole

through the Eccono-Jet - admitting a stream of air supposedly creates a better fuel mixture.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-4[Statement of Inventor, Howard Rock]
'Well the mileage, of course, will be
better - on longer trips - the tests
that we have, have proven that the
needle will generally get ten percent
improvement on gas mileage - and as
high as 17-18 miles to the gallon on
some of the larger cars driving on
the highway.?
"Eccono-Jet advertising says the Utah product
can add up to six miles per gallon.

And the company

has a stack of customer letters which supports its
claims.
"But there are skeptics.

A New Hampshire

auto expert says the idea dates back to 1939.

A. J.

White said the device can slightly increase mileage by
leaning the fuel mixture.

But White said the leaner

mixture created by the units heTs seen could cause
burned valves and the hole could admit dust into the
engine.
"Inventor Rock says thirty thousand units in
successful operation prove the skeptics wrong.

He

says he is now developing a new engine that will yield
60-70 miles per gallon.

And to top that the Utahn says

he!s close to a cure for cancer and the common cold.
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-5"A local auto executive said he personally
thinks such devices are a waste of money.

And Dr.

Grant Winn of the Utah Air Conservation Committee said
the Eccono-Jets would be unlawful if they alter - for
the vrorse - a car!s air pollution control equipment.
"In 1971, a California Government agency
tested Eccono-Jets and found the unit's decreased
carbon monoxide emissions but increased hydrocarbon
and nitrogen oxides emissions."

(R. 44-45)

Broadcast of December 31, 1973
"A Utah firm which sells what it says are
economy carburetor needles has sold Nine Hundred
Thousand Dollars1 worth since October.

A spokesman

for Direct International Buyer's Association says his
company has put 150 Thousand units into buyers' hands.
"Tony Kratz, speaking for the Utah company says Eccono-Jets are now being sold in many major U.S.
cities.

The units replace a car's carburetor idle

needles, and are supposed to increase gas economy up
to six miles per gallon.
Last month KSL News sent a set to Motor
Vehicle Research Laboratories in New Hampshire.
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In

-6his return letter, Director A. J. White said in his
opinion that the jets do not improve mileage.

White

said, further, that the rules of the U.S. Clean Air
Act prohibit disturbing a car's existing idle screws.
And he said replacement idle jets could cause engine
damage.

A spokesman for Eccono-Jets said his product

was being tested by the New Orleans Police Department,
and the test was going fvery well.!

But in New Orleans,

Captain Herman Saacks today said he's noticed no gas
mileage improvement with the jets installed in his
personal police car.
"Tony Kratz with Eccono-Jets insists his
product does work.

Kratz says the company's 1974

Camero has gone from 8-1/2 to 14 miles per gallon with
Eccono-Jets.

As to their legality, Kratz said he's

heard opinions both ways."

(R. 46)

Examination of these reports, viewed in their
entirety, reveals that they are not presented as a
biased criticism of plaintiff's product.

Rather, the

stories are balanced, setting forth both the "pros" and
the "cons" as to the relative merits of plaintiff's
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-7product.

The inventor of the device is specifically

quoted as to the claims which were made for it.

It

will be observed that one-half or more of the total
amount of each newscast quotes comment favorable to
the plaintiff1s product, and the other half quotes
comment.adverse to the plaintiff!s product.
It will be further noted that at no place
does the commentator express a personal opinion or view
as to the relative merits of the plaintiff's product.
He simply sets forth the views of proponents and
opponents.

Not a single statement in either newscast

has been shown or can be shown to be untrue.
The gravamen of plaintifffs complaint appears
to be that the newscasts did not contain all of the
factual background from which the statements which were
cited and quoted were distilled.

It obviously would

have been impossible in a short newscast to relate the
details of all of the examinations, tests and research
done by all of the persons whose opinions were cited.
The simple purpose of the newscasts was to acquaint the
public with the fact that there were conflicting views
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-8as to the merit of the Eccono-Jets so that the
listening public could make its own investigation and
determination as to the value of the devices.
Following publication of these newscasts,
plaintiff commenced this action against defendant.
(R. 1-7)

Upon the basis of the undisputed facts the

trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment (R. 88-89) and this appeal followed. (R. 100)
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Although this case has been characterized
by plaintiff's attorney as an action in defamation,
it is more properly described as an action for disparagement of quality of goods.

Although these two

torts are very similar and the rules applicable to them
are very much the same, there are some important differences.

These are spelled out in Restatement of Torts,

chapter 28, p. 323, as follows:
"Introductory Note: Liability for disparagement of the property in or the quality
of land, chattels or intangible things
differs in several highly important particulars from the liability for the publication
of matter which is defamatory to the personal
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-9reputation of another. In defamation, truth
is a defense required to be proved by the
publisher as defendant. In disparagement,
the person whose property in goods or the
quality of whose goods has been attacked
must prove that the disparaging expression
of opinion is incorrect. Again, in defamation, the publisher who seeks protection
of a conditional privilege must prove the
existence of the facts which create it.
In disparagement, the absence of privilege
must be proved by the person who seeks to
recover the financial loss caused by the
disparagement . . . . The action for disparagement . . . . cannot be used merely
to vindicate one's title to or the quality
of one's possessions.n (Emphasis added.)
See also 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, pp. 479481.
Perhaps the most significant difference, so
far as the issues of this appeal are concerned, is
that in an action for defamation, truth is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden of
proof, whereas in an action for the disparagement of
quality of goods, the falsity of a statement is one
of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of
action, and the plaintiff has the burden of proof.

See

Restatement of Torts, Sec. 651(c).
POINT I
THE STATEMENTS PUBLISHED BY DEFENDANT OF AND CONCERNING
PLAINTIFF'S PRODUCT WERE TRUE AND THEREFORE NOT ACTIONABLE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10The rule appears to be well established in
this country that truth is a complete defense to a civil
action for defamation or for disparagement of quality
of goods.

The rule is succinctly stated in the

Restatement of Torts, § 582, as follows:
"The truth of a defamatory statement
of fact is a complete defense to an action
for defamation."
To the same effect, see 1 Harper and James, The Law of
Torts, Sections 5.20 and 6.1; Prosser on Torts 4th Ed,
776, 797; 50 Am.Jur. 2d 676, 682, Libel and Slander,
§§ 173, 179.
In the early case of State v. Burnham, 9 N.H.
34, 31 Am. Dec. 217, 221 (1837), the court said:
l!!

If upon a lawful occasion for making
a publication, he has published the truth,
and no more, there is no sound principle
which can make him liable, even if he was
actuated by express malice. * * *
• !It has been said that it is lawful
to publish truth from good motives, and
for justifiable ends. But this rule is
too narrow. If there is a lawful occasion-a legal right to make a publication — and
the matter true, the end is justifiable,
and that, in such case, must be sufficient.™
This language was quoted with approval in Garrison v.
State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209.

See also

Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-111975.

The rule has been recognized in this state.

Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing Company,
83 Ut. 31, 27 P.2d 1.
As noted in our statement of facts, all of
the statements published by defendant concerning plaintiff's- product are shown to be true.

As previously

noted, the burden is upon the plaintiff to show the
falsity of the statements.
to do this.

No effort has been made

The record shows without dispute that each

statement made by the reporter was based upon factual
information in his file.

Even if his sources were not

accurate, no valid claim can be asserted that he did
not state their positions correctly.

This alone is a

sufficient defense, and under the authorities above
cited this alone warrants affirmance of the judgment
below.
POINT II
THE STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT WERE FAIR COMMENT UPON
A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND THEREFORE PRIVILEGED.
It is well established that matters of general
public interest are subject to fair comment by the news
media and others, and even if some of the comments are
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-12not entirely true, they are not actionable if not made
maliciously.

The social interest of the general public

in having access to information and to the benefit of
full and free discussion of issues of public interest
outweighs any private interest of an individual to be
free from adverse comment or criticism.

Restatement of

Torts, §§ 594, 598 and 606; Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed. 792.
As said in 1 Harper and James, The Law of Torts,
§ 5.28, p. 456:
"The principle of 'fair comment' affords
legal immunity for the honest expression of
opinion on matters of legitimate public
interest when based upon a true or privileged
statement of fact. This principle is of the
greatest importance to a democratic society
which enjoys the tradition of free speech."
See also 50 Am. Jur. 2d

807-808, Libel and

Slander, § 290:
"It is firmly established that matters
of public interest and concern are legitimate
subjects of fair comment and criticism, not
only in newspapers, and in radio and television broadcasts, but by members of the
public generally, and such comments and
criticisms are not actionable, however severe
in their terms, unless they are made maliciously. I!
See also op. cit., p. 830, § 308.
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-13A prime example of the application of this
rule is the decision of this court in Williams v.
Standard-Examiner Publishing Company, 83 Ut. 31, 27
P.2d 1.

In that case the defendant publishing company

had criticized the plaintiff city commissioner in the
most scathing terms.

He had been charged with criminal

negligence, manslaughter, criminal carelessness, lying,
incompetency, deliberate pollution of the water supply,
ignorance, defiance of valid orders and of being guilty
of crimes more reprehensible than those for which better
men were in prison.

All of these charges arose out of

a conclusion by the publisher, based upon apparently
valid evidence, that a typhoid epidemic resulted from
permitting contaminated waters to be introduced into
the municipal water supply.

Subsequent investigation

determined that the waters probably were not the cause
of the typhoid epidemic.

Plaintiff commenced an action

for defamation and recovered a judgment in the trial
court which was reversed on appeal.

This court said:

"That appellant and the residents of
Ogden City had a common interest in the
threatened typhoid epidemic, in its source,
and in the prevention of its spread, is not
open to question. It is equally clear that
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-14appellant and the inhabitants of Ogden
had a common interest in fixing, if
possible, the responsibility for the
outbreak of the disease, and in taking
such steps as might be necessary to
check its spread and prevent its recurrence. Information concerning the
manner in which plaintiff as city
commissioner in charge of the waterworks department of the city had been
and was handling the city culinary
water supply was likewise a matter of
common interest to appellant and the
citizens of Ogden. 36 C.J. 1284,
§291, and cases there cited; People
v. Glassman, 12 Utah, 238, 42 P. 956.
Appellant by informing its readers upon
such matters was performing a duty which
falls within that class mentioned in
the rules as 'of a moral or social
character of imperfect obligation. f l!
This court further held that the comments of the
defendant newspaper were made in good faith without
actual malice, with reasonable or probable grounds
for believing them to be true, and that the comments
were reasonable and fair in light of the facts and
circumstances that existed or appeared to exist at
the time of the publication.

This court also quoted

with approval from Newell on Slander and Libel 4th Ed.,
as follows:
n

Criticism differs from defamation
in the following particulars.
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l. Criticism deals only with such
things as invite public attention or call
for public comment. . . .
!

2. It
but only his
attack is on
and not upon

never attacks the individual,
work. . . . In every case the
a man's acts, or on some thing,
the man himself. . . .

'Every person has a right to publish
such fair and candid criticism, although
the author may suffer loss from it. . . .
Liberty of criticism must be allowed or we
should neither have purity of taste nor of
morals. Fair discussion is essentially
necessary to the truth of history and the
advancement of science. A publication,
therefore, which has for its object, not
to injure the reputation of any individual,
but to correct misrepresentations of fact,
to refute sophistical reasoning. . . is not
actionable. . . .
11

. . . A fair and bona fide comment
on a matter of public interest is an excuse
of what would otherwise be a defamatory
publication. . . . I!l
The court also quoted with approval from 36 C.J., as
follows :
§285: ,M . . . The right of comment is not
restricted to a restatement of the naked
facts. As a general rule it may include
the right to draw inferences or express
opinions from facts established. The
soundness of the inferences or opinions
is immaterial whether they are right or
wrong, provided they are made in good
faith and based upon the truth. . . . !ff
§287: M l . . . The criticism may be severe,
harsh, bitter, or sarcastic. Mere exaggeration, ridicule, or even gross exaggeration
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-16does not of itself make the comment or
criticism so unfair as to destroy the
immunity. It is generally held that such
comment may be caustic or severe if the
facts warrant it.!!f
And finally the court said:
" • • To say that the writer and
publisher of the articles here in question
was motivated by a desire to injure plaintiff
rather than for the purpose of promoting the
public weal would be a mere guess. Upon
this record a finding that the article
declared on was published with malice in
fact is without any substantial evidence
to support it. There is an abundance of
evidence tending to show that the articles
were published with a proper motive.
n

We are of the opinion that the court
below w • s in error in refusing to grant the
motion or a nonsuit and the motion for a
directed verdict.11 (Emphasis added.)
It will be noted that the criticism published by the
plaintiff in the Williams case was far more severe, than
the criticism published of the plaintiff's product here.
Likewise, there was less basis of truth in the statements published by the defendant in that case than in
the broadcast by the defendant here.
A more recent case involving publication of
defamatory statements concerning a political candidate
was Demman v. Star Broadcasting Company, 28 Utah 2d 50,
497 P.2d 1378.

In that case the defendant radio station
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-17in a talk show permitted statements to be braodcast
reflecting upon the plaintiff's integrity, his business
and professional competence, and his personal morals.
This court affirmed a summary judgment granted in favor
of the defendant broadcasting company on the grounds
that the publication was privileged and not shown to
have been malicious.
It is clear that the privilege of fair comment
and criticism is not limited to public officials,
candidates for public office, celebrities etc., but
extends to all matters of public interest and concern,
anything submitted to the public for approval such as
merchandise, advertisements etc. 50 Am. Jur.2d, Libel
and Slander §291; Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed. 828.
In the case of All Diet Foods Distributors,
Inc., v. Time, Inc., 56 Misc.2d 821, 290 N.Y.S.2d 445,
defendant published a book showing a picture of plaintiff's store front captioned with the words, "Food
Fads and Frauds.!! A libel action by the plaintiff
against the defendant was dismissed, the court saying:
"Certainly the subject matter of the
article under review if of considerable
public interest and it cannot be said of the
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-18conduct of the defendant with respect to
motivation that the complaint meets the
required standards. Certainly the intent
here was not merely to injure through
falsehood; rather the motivation was the
protection of the public in the disclosure
of a highly important matter affecting the
public interest.
"The motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.!!
In the case of Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc.,
v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc.2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 325,
defendant published an article critical of food served
at plaintiff's restaurant.

Plaintiff commenced an

action in libel against the defendant, and summary
judgment was granted in favor of the defendant, the
court saying:
"Even assuming that the article had
defamatory content, Lollypop, as a public
facility, must show more than a published
false statement to recover. It must
overcome the qualified privilege of fair
comment which protects criticism of institutions serving the public. . . .
"Under recent United State Supreme
Court pronouncements, comment upon the
activities of a public figure or private
individual's involvement in an event of
public interest is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment's guaranty
of free speech and a free press. Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct.
1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Certainly,
a restaurant which serves food to the general public is involved in an enterprise
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-19of public interest. . . . Preservation of
freedom to write about restaurants, to
criticize or compliment, is another form
of safeguard, and is a vital channel through
which the publicfs right to know is protected. . . .
"Therefore, commentaries in a newspaper
about a public restaurant's service and food
even if false are immune from defamation
liability unless a showing is made that the
statements were motivated by malice or made
with wanton disregard. . . . Unless plaintiff can show by 'clear and convincing
proof that the defamatory falsehood was
published with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not', Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., supra, 403 U.S. at 52, 91 S.Ct. at
1824, an action for libel will not lie. . . .
"Since Lollypop does not cite any
specific grudge or malice that defendants
may have had in publishing the article, the
presence or absence of malice or reckless
disregard must be determined from the context of the article, its tone and quality,
the manner of its preparation, and the
content of the specific statements made. . . .
"To defeat defendants' motion for
summary judgment, Lollypop must do more
than rely upon conclusory allegations in
the complaint. It must show convincing
evidentiary facts of actual malice. . . . "
In Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295
F.S. 704, affd. 426 F.2d 862, a magazine article
critical of plaintiff's hotel was held to be privileged,
even though some of the statements were not one hundred
percent true.
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-20To the same effect see All Diet Foods
Distributors, Inc., v. Time, Inc., 290 N.Y.S.2d 445;
Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publishing Co.,
(D.C. App.), 454 F.2d 1050; and Curtis Publishing Co.,
v. Butts, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 388 U.S. 130.
Plaintiff relies principally upon three
cases:

Utah Farm Bureau Fed, v. Natl

Farmers Union

Sv. Corp., (10 Cir.), 198 F.2d 20; Carey v. Hearst
Publications, 19 Wash.2d 655, 143 P.2d 857; and
Berry v. Moench, 8 Ut.2d 191, 331 P.2d 814.

All of

these cases were decided long before N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, and its
progeny (more fully discussed under our next point)
and to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith,
they are completely invalid.

Apart from that, they

are all significantly different from the case at bar.
In both U. Farm Bureau and Carey the words published
were libelous per se.

In Berry, the action was not

really in defamation, but for breach of plaintiff's
privilege against revealing confidential information
obtained in the doctor-patient relationship.

Nor did

the case involve a matter of general or public interest.
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-21The facts of all these cases are so different from those
in the case at bar as to make them of no persuasive
value.
POINT III
THE WORDS PUBLISHED BY DEFENDANT ARE PROTECTED FROM
CIVIL LIABILITY BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
In the case of New York Times Company v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, the Supreme
Court of the United States determined that the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and of the
press, protect even some untrue statements from civil
liability.

Said the court:
T,

The general proposition that freedom
of expression upon public questions if
secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said,
'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about
of political and social changes desired
by the people1. . . .
"Thus we consider this case against the
background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials. . . .
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Authoritative interpretations of the
First Amendment guarantees have consistently
refused to recognize an exception for any
test of truth--whether administered by judges,
juries, or administrative officials — and
especially one that puts the burden of
proving truth on the speaker. . . .
n

The constitutional protection does not
turn upon 'the truth, popularity, or social
utility of the ideas and beliefs which are
offered1....
"As Madison said, 'Some degree of abuse
is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance is this more true
than in that of the press.'"
This decision was followed and expanded in
subsequent cases.

See Garrison v. State of Louisiana,

379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209.

In Curtis Publishing Co. v.

Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, the court said:
". . . The dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters of public
interest is for us, in the historic words
of the Declaration of Independence, an
'unalienable right1 that 'governments are
instituted among men to secure.'. . ."
i< i t >V *>V

"Our touchstones are that acceptable
limitations must neither affect 'the
impartial distribution of news' and ideas,
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations
Board, supra, 301 U.S., at 133, 57 S.Ct.,
at 656, nor because of their history or
impact constitute a special burden on the
press, Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed.
660, nor deprive our free society of the
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-23stimulating benefit of varied ideas because
their purveyors fear physical or economic
retribution solely because of what they
choose to think and publish."
In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
88 S.Ct. 1323, the court said:
11

. . . Neither lies nor false communications serve the ends of the First Amendment, and no one suggests their desirability
or further proliferation. But to insure
the ascertainment and publication of the
truth about public affairs, it is essential
that the First Amendment protect some
erroneous publications as well as true
ones. . . .!!
See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811.
Inc.,

U.S.

In Gertz v. Robert Welch,

, 94 S.Ct. 2997, the court said:

"Although the erroneous statement of
fact is not worthy of constitutional
protection, it is nevertheless inevitable
in free debate. As James Madison pointed
out in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, fSome degree of abuse is
inseparable from the proper use of everything; and in no instance is this more
true than that of the press.1 4 Elliot's
Debates (1876), p.571. And punishment of
error runs the risk of inducing a cautious
and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech
and press. Our decisions recognize that a
rule of strict liability that compels a
publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the
accuracy of his factual assertions may
lead to intolerable self-censorship.
Allowing the media to avoid liability only
by proving the truth of all injurious
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-24statements does not accord adequate protection to First Amendment liberties. . . .
The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters.
Under these Supreme Court decisions what
was once a common law qualified privilege has now been
determined to be a constitutionally guaranteed right.
See Prosser on Torts 4th Ed., pp. 819, 822-823, ch. 21,
§ 118.
POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE.
We recognize that summary judgment is a
drastic remedy, to be sparingly used.

However, where,

as here, there is no real dispute as to the facts, and
the issues are essentially legal, summary judgment is
appropriate, sparing both the parties and the court
unnecessary and burdensome time and expense.

See

Holland v. Columbia Iron Min. Co., 4 Ut.2d 303, 293 P.2d
700; Dupler v. Yates, 10 Ut.2d 251, 351 P.2d 624;
Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 Ut.2d
329, 353 P.2d 168; Henry v. Washiki Club, Inc., 11 Ut.2d
138, 355 P.2d 973, 6 Moorefs Fed. Prac. , § 56.04 p. 2028.
The remedy of summary judgment has been found
by many courts to be appropriate in defamation suits
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-25In the case of Steak Bit of Westbury, Inc.
v. Newsday, Inc., 70 Misc.2d 437, 334 N.Y.S.2d 325, the
court said:
"In a motion for summary judgment, the
threshold test of showing malice or reckless
disregard is vital to the enforcement of
the consitutional privilege of fair comment.
Without the demonstrated presence of these
elements, the publisher should not be burdened with a full trial and its consequent
inhibitory effect upon future exercise of
free speech and press. . . ." (Empahsis
added.)
In holding that summary judgment was appropriate in the Bon Air case the court said:
"Actual malice is a constitutional
issue to be decided initially by the trial
judge vis-a-vis motions for summary judgment and directed verdict. The functions
of the trial court judge and the jury have
been explained as follows:
1

In my judgment New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan makes actual malice
a constitutional issue to be decided
in the first instance by the trial
judge applying the Times test of
actual knowledge or reckless disregard of the truth. . . . Unless
the court finds, on the basis of
pretrial affidavits, depositions or
other documentary evidence, that
the plaintiff can prove actual
malice in the Times sense, it
should grant summary judgment for
the defendant. * * * f
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Thus it is clear that, where a
publication is protected by the New York
Times immunity rule, summary judgment,
rather than trial on the merits, is a
proper vehicle for affording constitutional protection in the proper case.
Judge Tuttle in Time, Inc. v. McLaney,
supra 406 F.2d at 566, recognized the
appropriateness of summary judgment:
!

The subject matter of this
litigation, involving, as it does,
the very serious and timely question
of how far the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press
may still be impinged upon by
actions for libel, places some
cases in a somewhat different
category. This follows when the
trial court and this court jointly
consider that the failure to dismiss
a libel suit might necessitate long
and expensive trial proceddings,
which, if not really warranted,
would themselves offend the principles enunciated in Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct.
1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22, because of the
chilling effect of such litigation.!
"The District of Columbia Circuit
placed a similar emphasis on the role of
summary judgments in defamation actions :
'In the First Amendment area,
summary procedures are even more
essential. For the stake here,
if harassment succeeds, is free
debate. * * * Unless persons, including newspapers, desiring to
exercise their First Amendment
rights are assured freedom from
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-27the harassment of lawsuits, they
will tend to become self-censors.
And to this extent debate on
public issues * * * will become
less uninhibited, less robust,
and less wide-open, for self
censorship affecting the whole
public is 'hardly less virulent
for being privately administered.1
Smith v. People of State of
California, 361 U.S. 147, 154,
80 S.Ct. 215, 219, 4 L.Ed.2d 205
(1959).'
Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 125 U.S.
App. D.C. 32, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (1966)."
And in concluding the court said:
"Freedom of expression must have
a necessary breathing space if it is to
survive. If these statements raise
factual issues of actual malice, that
necessary breathing space becomes almost
meaningless. As has been noted, actual
malice is a constitutional issue to be
determined initially by the trial judge
on motion for summary judgment. We
are convinced that Bon Air has not
presented issues of fact from which a
jury could find that Time published the
article with actual knowledge of its
falsity or with a reckless disregard
as to whether or not it was false.11
The case of Cervantes v. Time, Inc.,
(8th Cir.) 464 F.2d 986, is of particular interest
because there, as here, summary judgment was entered
in favor of the defendant, notwithstanding the fact
that the newsman had claimed a privilege of nondisclosure
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-28of his information sources.

The plaintiff had sought

an order compelling disclosure, and the summary judgment was granted without requiring disclosure.

The

following excerpts from the opinion of the court are
pertinent:

-

"The District Court ; . . did not reach
the merits of the motion to compel. However,
on the basis of a well-developed record
consisting of affidavits, depositions, and
other documentary evidence, it entered
summary judgment for the defendants on the
grounds that neither defendant had knowledge
of falsity, that neither entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of any statement in
the article, and that neither acted with
reckless disregard for truth or falsity. . .
* * *

*

"Central to the mayor*s appellate
attack is his contention that he cannot
possibly meet his burden of proof if the
reporter is allowed to hide behind anonymous
news sources. . . .
•JV

VC VC V C

11

. . . Nevertheless, on the facts of
this particular case, we believe that in his
preoccupation with the identity of Life!s
news sources, the mayor has overlooked the
central point involved in this appeal: that
the depositions and other evidentiary materials comprising this record establish, without
room for substantial argument, facts that
entitled both defendants to judgment as a
matter of law, viz., that, quite apart from
the tactics employed in collecting data for
the article, the mayor has wholly failed to
demonstrate with convincing clarity that
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-29either defendant acted with knowing or
reckless disregard of the truth. . . .
"'When a motion for summary judgment
is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits
or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him.f. . ."
i< i< i?

11

. . . The point of principal importance is that there must be a showing of
cognizable prejudice before the failure
to permit examination of anonymous news
sources can arise to the level of error.
Mere speculation or conjecture about the
fruits of such examination simply will
not suffice.
lf

But such is not this case. As the
opinion of the District Court makes clear>
the record contains substantial evidence
indicating that it was over a period of
many months that Life's reporter carefully collected and documented the data
on the basis of which the article was
written and published. . . .
11

. . . Where, as here, the published
materials, objectively considered in the
light of all the evidence, must be taken
as having been published in good faith,
without actual malice and on the basis
of very careful verification efforts,
that is, they were published in good
faith without regard to the identity of
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-30the news sources, there is no rule of
law or policy consideration of which
we are aware that counsels compulsory
revelation of news sources. Neither
is there any evidence by which a jury
could reasonably find liability under
the constitutionally required instructions. When these factors conjoin,
the proper disposition is to grant the
defense motion for summary judgment.
The judgment of the District Court
must therefore be affirmed.11
CONCLUSION
Basic to the fundamental freedoms enjoyed by
the citizens of this state and nation are the freedom
of speech and freedom of the press.

These guarantee

"uninhibited, robust and wide-openn debate on issues of
public interest and concern.

Those who appeal to the

public market for patronage must be subjected the
scrutiny of adverse comment and criticism.

The media

should not be hampered in the exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed freedoms by fear of litigation
which, even though not meritorious may be ruinously
expensive to defend, particularly if there is full-scale
trial of every case.

Where as here, there is no showing

of falsity, and no showing of malice, and where the
publication amounts to nothing more than a fair comment
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-31upon a matter of public interest, summary judgment
should be granted as was done in this case.

We respect-

fully submit that the judgment below should be affirmed.
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